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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
This case arises from the shooting death of Lawson 
Hunt in August 2006.  Appellant Jeffrey Workman was one of 
two people to shoot Hunt, and was convicted of first-degree 
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murder in Pennsylvania on a theory of transferred intent.  His 
trial counsel, pursuing what might generously be called a 
unique theory of criminal liability, did not meaningfully test 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s case.  According to 
Workman, his trial counsel told him that he could not be 
convicted of murder because Hunt was already dead when he 
was struck by Workman’s bullet.  Based on this representation, 
Workman declined a plea bargain for a 20-year term of 
imprisonment.  In post-conviction proceedings, Workman’s 
post-conviction counsel failed to make a claim for ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to 
present a cogent defense. 
 
Workman appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective.  Although his claim 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally 
defaulted in state post-conviction relief proceedings, he argues 
that his default should be excused because his state post-
conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  
Respondents argue that Workman cannot show his attorneys 
rendered ineffective assistance and therefore cannot excuse his 
procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan.1 
 
Because Workman’s state post-conviction counsel’s 
assistance was ineffective and because his underlying 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim has some merit, we 
excuse his procedural default of his underlying claim under 
Martinez.  Because, on the face of the record, trial counsel’s 
assistance was manifestly ineffective, we will reverse the 
                                              
1 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
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Order of the District Court and remand with instructions to 
grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. 
 
I. Facts 
A. The Shooting of Lawson Hunt 
In August 2006, Gary Moses shot Lawson Hunt in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Hearing the shots, Workman 
found Hunt, saw Moses, and fired at Moses.  Workman fired 
eight times.  One bullet ricocheted off a solid object and struck 
Hunt in the chest.  Hunt died as a result of his injuries.  
According to the assistant medical examiner, who testified at 
trial, either of the two bullets that struck Hunt could have been 
fatal. 
 
B. Workman’s Trial 
Workman was charged with first-degree murder, with 
Moses as a co-defendant.  The Commonwealth’s theory of 
transferred intent argued that Workman, firing at Moses, had 
intended to kill Moses and therefore his intent to kill Moses 
transferred when his bullet struck Hunt.  At trial, Assistant 
Medical Examiner Edwin Lieberman testified that Hunt’s 
death was caused by two gunshot wounds.  He testified that the 
wound to Hunt’s chest, caused by the richocheted bullet fired 
by Workman, was “much more immediately fatal,”2 but the 
other bullet (fired by Moses) “certainly [could have] cause[d] 
death,” depending “upon the time between the shooting or the 
time he’s shot and the time he gets to the hospital and how 
quickly they can do something about it.”3  In other words, 
                                              
2 App. at 196. 
3 Id. 
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Lieberman could not definitively state that Moses’s bullet, and 
not Workman’s, had killed Hunt.  In fact, Lieberman testified 
that, based on the blood evidence surrounding the ricocheted 
bullet wound, he believed Hunt had still been alive when he 
was struck by the bullet fired by Workman.  Workman’s trial 
counsel cross-examined Lieberman, but this cross-examination 
focused on eliciting testimony that Lieberman could not 
establish that Workman’s bullet hit Hunt before Moses’s 
bullet. 
 
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-
chief, Workman’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal.  
He argued that because Moses fired first and because “to a 
reasonable medical certainty the first bullet killed” Hunt, 
Workman could not be convicted because “he has fired into the 
body of a man that is dead and you can’t kill a dead man.”4  He 
made this argument despite Lieberman’s testimony, which 
included the opinion that Hunt was alive when struck by 
Workman’s bullet.  The Commonwealth pointed out that 
inconsistency.  The trial court denied the motion. 
Having reserved his opening statement for the 
beginning of Workman’s case-in-chief, Workman’s trial 
counsel simply stated: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
you’ve been very patient for six or 
seven days.  I will inform you now 
as the judge will later charge you, 
Jeffrey Workman will not present 
any evidence.  So I’m opening to 
you and not saying that we’re 
                                              
4 App. at 231. 
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presenting anything.  You’ll get 
the full impact of that when the 
judge charges you later in the case.  
Thank you very much.5 
Workman’s counsel called no witnesses and presented 
no evidence, resting immediately.  In closing, Workman’s trial 
counsel reiterated his theory: that because codefendant Moses 
shot Hunt first, the Commonwealth could not establish that 
Workman killed Hunt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Despite 
Lieberman’s testimony regarding the blood evidence 
suggesting that Hunt survived the immediate aftermath of 
Moses’s gunshot, Workman’s trial counsel stated: 
 
But the point of the matter is [Hunt 
is] fired on by the first bullet.  He 
goes down.  The blood spots are 
near or at that spot.  No showing 
that he moved around or did 
anything.  He’s dead.  He’s dead 
from the first bullet.  And when the 
doctor has – and this is the last 
thing I’m going to say about that – 
the unmitigated gall in his position 
as a Philadelphia medical 
examiner to come into this 
courtroom and tell you the man 
was alive when the ricochet hit him 
and he doesn’t know where the 
ricochet shot comes from . . . at 
that given point you must conclude 
                                              
5 App. at 265. 
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that they have not proved their case 
beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the doctor’s testimony is 
absolutely incredulous.6 
 The jury convicted Workman of first-degree murder.  It 
acquitted Moses.  Workman received a mandatory sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole. 
 
C. Workman’s State Post-Conviction 
Proceedings 
Workman’s first opportunity to raise a claim regarding 
the performance of his trial counsel was during Pennsylvania 
post-conviction proceedings under the Post Conviction Relief 
Act.7  After being appointed counsel and filing an amended 
petition, Workman’s petition raised a single claim: “ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel for failing to request a jury 
instruction that indicated that the transferred intent doctrine 
also applied to the petitioner’s claim of defense of use of force 
to protect a third person.”8 
 
Workman’s state post-conviction counsel did not raise 
any argument concerning Workman’s trial counsel’s failure to 
present evidence or argue consistently with the evidence 
presented by the jury. 
 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, addressing the 
claim, found that “review of the certified record reveals that 
the trial court gave a thorough jury instruction regarding the 
                                              
6 App. at 275. 
7 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq. 
8 App. at 329. 
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defense of force to protect a third person.”9  It concluded that 
the “nonsensical claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
lack[ed] merit,” and noted that “even if we could make sense 
of [Workman’s] argument, he fails to establish how inclusion 
of the requested jury instructions would have been so 
influential that it would have likely changed the outcome of 
[Workman’s] trial.”10 
 
D. Workman’s Habeas Proceedings 
Workman petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court.  One ground upon which 
he petitioned was that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial and on direct appeal.11  Proceeding pro se, he 
stated that “[t]rail [sic] counsel told me that given the 
[C]ommonwealth’s case and evidence as a whole there was no 
way under the law I could be convicted, which impacted my 
decisions through out [sic] the proceedings.”12  He alleged in 
his petition that he included this in his initial post-conviction 
motion, but his appointed post-conviction counsel “did not 
brief it to the courts.”13  He did not specifically allege that he 
told post-conviction counsel of this claim in his petition.  He 
did, however, specifically allege that, with regard to this claim, 
                                              
9 App. at 344. 
10 Id. 
11 Workman’s trial counsel continued to represent Workman 
on direct appeal.  Nevertheless, procedural default of 
ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel is not eligible to 
be excused under Martinez.  See Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 
2058, 2063 (2017). 
12 App. at 355. 
13 Id. 
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the Commonwealth failed to prove he killed Hunt.  Further, in 
his reply to Respondents’ Answer to Workman’s habeas 
petition, Workman stated: 
 
Also again to clarify what is meant 
by this claim of ineffectiveness 
[sic] assistance of counsel was not 
to limit the claim to the advice of 
counsel, but to counsel’s overall 
performance. . . .  Counsel did not 
only tell me this [deficient advice], 
he used it as his sole defense at 
trial.14 
In his reply, Workman also stated that counsel’s 
ineffective assistance “ultimately lead [sic] me to deny a plea 
offer, [and to] not testify.”15 
The petition was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who 
issued a Report and Recommendation that the petition be 
dismissed.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that Workman’s 
claims were without merit.  In his objections to the Report and 
Recommendation, Workman stated that his trial counsel’s 
conduct led him to deny a plea agreement offered by the 
Commonwealth of between ten and twenty years’ 
imprisonment.  Moreover, Workman also stated that but for 
trial counsel’s statement that he could not be convicted, he 
would have testified in his own defense. 
 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation.  With respect to Workman’s 
                                              
14 App. at 442 (emphasis added). 
15 Id. 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which are before us 
now, it held that Workman could not excuse procedural default 
under Martinez.  The District Court refused to consider 
Workman’s allegations regarding his failure to accept the plea 
offer and his failure to testify, because it mistakenly believed 
these allegations were first raised in his objections to the report 
and recommendation.  It concluded that Workman had not 
shown prejudice from trial counsel’s allegedly deficient 
performance, though it did not conclude that trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient, because Workman did not specify 
“the alternate actions he would have taken but for trial 
counsel’s purportedly defective advice.”16  It concluded that 
Workman’s post-conviction counsel was not deficient.  Noting 
that it presumed the reasonableness of post-conviction 
counsel’s strategic choices,  the Court stated that Workman’s 
ability to rebut that presumption was undermined by 
Workman’s failure to allege either of two events.  First, 
Workman failed to allege that he informed his post-conviction 
counsel that his trial counsel told him that he could not be 
convicted.  Second, Workman failed to allege that his post-
conviction counsel was aware of this allegation.  The District 
Court dismissed the petition, and Workman applied for a 
certificate of appealability. 
 
E. Proceedings Before This Court 
We granted a certificate of appealability in October 
2016.  In January 2018, we amended the certificate of 
appealability sua sponte.  The amended certificate states, in 
full: 
                                              
16 App. at 23. 
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The foregoing request for a 
certificate of appealability is 
granted as to Workman’s claim 
that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel 
when he gave erroneous advice 
that Workman could not be 
convicted and thus failed to 
present a cogent defense strategy 
at trial.  Jurists of reason might 
well agree that this claim is 
procedurally defaulted, as it was 
not presented to the Superior Court 
and Pennsylvania courts would 
now refuse to consider the claim in 
a new Post Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”) petition.  See 42 Pa. 
C.S. § 9545(b); Slack v. McDaniel, 
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).  
However, “[w]here, under state 
law, claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel must be 
raised in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding, a procedural 
default will not bar a federal 
habeas court from hearing a 
substantial claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial if, in the initial-
review collateral proceeding, there 
was no counsel or counsel in that 
proceeding was ineffective.”  
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 
1320 (2012).  Jurists of reason 
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could debate whether Workman’s 
claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for providing erroneous 
advice that he could not be 
convicted and thus failed to 
present any cogent defense at trial, 
causing him to reject a plea offer, 
was substantial.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88, 694 (1984).  Jurists of reason 
could also debate whether PCRA 
counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise the claim on initial-
collateral review.  On this ground 
only, we find that the District 
Court’s procedural ruling is 
debatable and that Workman has 
met his burden of making a 
substantial showing of the denial 
of a constitutional right.  Slack v. 
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 
(2000). The application for a 
certificate of appealability is 
denied as to all other issues.  
Notably, jurists of reason would 
agree that evidence was sufficient 
to support Workman’s 
convictions.  Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
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II. Discussion17 
Workman’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel on the basis of trial counsel’s failure to present a 
cogent defense and trial counsel’s defective advice was never 
presented to the state courts in post-conviction relief 
proceedings.  It is procedurally defaulted.  Accordingly, he 
must rely on the exception established by Martinez.  
 
A. Excusing Procedural Default Under Martinez 
v. Ryan 
Martinez recognizes a narrow exception to the doctrine 
of procedural default: “Inadequate assistance of counsel at 
initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial.”18  This exception is available to a petitioner 
who can show that: 1) his procedurally defaulted ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim has “some merit”19; and that 
2) his state-post conviction counsel was “ineffective under the 
standards of Strickland v. Washington.”20  We explain these 
requirements in turn. 
 
                                              
17 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We 
review the legal conclusions of the District Court de novo.  
Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 1997). 
18 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. 
19 Id. at 14 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 
(2003)). 
20 Id. 
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 The Underlying Claim Must Have 
“Some Merit” 
To excuse procedural default on an ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim under Martinez, that claim 
must be substantial—it must have “some merit.”21  Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, the case on which the Supreme Court based its 
description of what a “substantial claim” entails, concerns the 
standards for issuing a certificate of appealability.  To 
demonstrate that his claim has some merit, a petitioner must 
“show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that 
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to 
deserve encouragement to proceed further.”22 
 
This is different from the standard applied on the merits 
under Strickland v. Washington.23  That standard requires a 
petitioner to show counsel was “deficient,” meaning “that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed to the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.”24  A petitioner must also show that “the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense,” which 
“requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”25  This is an exacting 
                                              
21 Id. (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322). 
22 Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (internal citation, quotation 
marks, and alteration omitted). 
23 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
24 Id. at 687. 
25 Id. 
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standard,26 reflecting the reluctance of the courts to second-
guess strategic decisions made by counsel. 
 
 State Post-Conviction Counsel Must Be 
Ineffective 
A substantial claim alone is not sufficient to excuse a 
petitioner’s procedural default.  Martinez holds that state post-
conviction counsel must be “ineffective under the standards of 
Strickland v. Washington” to excuse the procedural default of 
the underlying claim.27 
 
We have described Strickland as containing two prongs, 
both of which must be met to sustain a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: the “performance” and “prejudice” 
prongs.28  The “performance” prong refers to Strickland’s 
requirement that “counsel’s representation fell below an 
                                              
26 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) 
(noting that the Strickland standard is “highly demanding”). 
27 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. 
28 See Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 238 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“To prove ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Strickland v. Washington, a petitioner must prove ‘(1) 
that his counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, it fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his client,’ i.e., that 
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’ We have previously referred to these as the 
‘performance’ and ‘prejudice’ prongs of the Strickland test.” 
(citation omitted)).  
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objective standard of reasonableness.”29  The “prejudice” 
prong refers to Strickland’s requirement that a petitioner show 
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”30  
 
For Workman to show that his state post-conviction 
counsel’s deficient performance caused prejudice under 
Strickland, he must show that his state post-conviction counsel 
could have obtained a different result had he presented the 
now-defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.  
In other words, he must prove the merits of his underlying 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in order to excuse 
the procedural default of that claim and obtain consideration 
on the merits.  At this stage, what is important is that the 
underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is 
“substantial,” not that a petitioner has, in fact, been 
“prejudiced” by trial counsel’s deficient performance under 
Strickland. 
 
If the use of the word “substantial” and the phrase 
“some merit” rather than “prejudicial” does not make it 
explicit, the Supreme Court clearly implies, by relying on 
Miller-El v. Cockrell in its requirement that the claim be 
substantial, that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim must be evaluated under a standard less exacting 
than Strickland prejudice.31  In Martinez, the Court 
                                              
29 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. 
30 Id. at 694. 
31 See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14; Bey, 856 F.3d at 238 
(interpreting Martinez as “suggesting that we apply the 
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acknowledged that an unrepresented or ineffectively 
represented prisoner likely cannot vindicate an ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim: 
 
Without the help of an adequate 
attorney, a prisoner will have 
similar difficulties vindicating a 
substantial ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim.  Claims of 
ineffective assistance at trial often 
require investigative work and an 
understanding of trial strategy.  
When the issue cannot be raised on 
direct review, moreover, a prisoner 
asserting an ineffective-assistance-
of-trial-counsel claim in an initial-
review collateral proceeding 
cannot rely on a court opinion or 
the prior work of an attorney 
addressing that claim. . . .  To 
present a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial in accordance 
with the State’s procedures, then, a 
prisoner likely needs an effective 
attorney. 
The same would be true if the State 
did not appoint an attorney to assist 
in the initial-review collateral 
proceeding.  The prisoner, 
                                              
standard for issuing certificates of appealability in resolving 
the inquiry into what constitutes a ‘substantial’ claim”). 
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unlearned in the law, may not 
comply with the State’s procedural 
rules or may misapprehend the 
substantive details of federal 
constitutional law. . . .  While 
confined to prison, the prisoner is 
in no position to develop the 
evidentiary basis for a claim of 
ineffective assistance, which often 
turns on evidence outside the trial 
record.32 
Martinez also recognizes that “[a] finding of cause and 
prejudice does not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief. It 
merely allows a federal court to consider the merits of a claim 
that otherwise would have been procedurally defaulted.”33  
 
Two other appellate courts have considered the role of 
Martinez’s “substantial” requirement and whether the 
underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim must 
also be analyzed under the exacting bar of Strickland.  In our 
view, and in accordance with the view shared by the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits, when a petitioner shows that post-
conviction relief counsel’s performance was unreasonably 
deficient, the requirement that the deficient performance result 
in prejudice may be satisfied “with a substantial claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel that would otherwise 
have been deemed defaulted.”34 
                                              
32 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 11–12 (internal citations omitted). 
33 Id. at 17. 
34 Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502, 513 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 
Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
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In Detrich v. Ryan,35 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
application of Martinez in light of Trevino v. Thaler.36  In 
Trevino, the Supreme Court set out the four requirements of 
Martinez: 
 
We consequently read Coleman as 
containing an exception, allowing 
a federal habeas court to find 
“cause,” thereby excusing a 
defendant's procedural default, 
where (1) the claim of 
“ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel” was a “substantial” 
claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of 
there being “no counsel” or only 
“ineffective” counsel during the 
state collateral review proceeding; 
(3) the state collateral review 
proceeding was the “initial” 
review proceeding in respect to 
the “ineffective-assistance-of-
trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state 
law requires that an “ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel [claim] 
. . . be raised in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding.”37 
Addressing “prejudice,” the Ninth Circuit recognized that:  
                                              
35 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013). 
36 569 U.S. 413 (2013). 
37 Id. at 423 (citing Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12–18). 
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If a prisoner who had [post-
conviction relief] counsel were 
required to show prejudice, in the 
ordinary Strickland sense, 
resulting from his [post-conviction 
relief] counsel’s deficient 
performance in order to satisfy the 
second Martinez requirement, the 
prisoner would have to show, as a 
condition for excusing his 
procedural default of a claim, that 
he would succeed on the merits of 
that same claim.38 
The Ninth Circuit rejected that notion.  The Court 
concluded that, “for the narrow purpose of satisfying the 
second Martinez requirement to establish ‘cause,’ a prisoner 
need only show that his [post-conviction relief] counsel 
performed in a deficient matter.”39  The Court explained that 
“[a] prisoner need not show actual prejudice resulting from his 
[post-conviction relief] counsel’s deficient performance, over 
and above his required showing that the [ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel] claim be ‘substantial’ under the 
first Martinez requirement.”40   
The Ninth Circuit also considered Justice Breyer’s 
statement “respecting the denial of the petition for the writ of 
certiorari” in Gallow v. Cooper,41 understanding him to 
                                              
38 Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1246. 
39 Id. at 1245. 
40 Id. at 1245–46. 
41 570 U.S. 933 (2013). 
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distinguish between “cause” under the second prong of 
Martinez and “cause and prejudice” under Strickland: “That is, 
cause and prejudice under Strickland are determined separately 
from, and after, a determination of ‘cause’ under Martinez.”42  
Justice Breyer, who wrote for the Court in Trevino, wrote in 
Gallow that “[t]he ineffective assistance of state habeas 
counsel might provide cause to excuse the default of the claim, 
thereby allowing the federal habeas court to consider the full 
contours of Gallow’s ineffective-assistance claim.”43  We 
agree with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.  Whether the 
ineffectiveness of post-conviction relief counsel provided 
cause to excuse procedural default is separate from the 
question of whether an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 
claim would prevail on the merits. 
 
In Brown v. Brown,44 the Seventh Circuit adopted the 
Ninth Circuit’s rule and as follows: “To demonstrate cause 
under Martinez-Trevino, the petitioner must show deficient 
performance by counsel on collateral review as required under 
the first prong of the Strickland analysis. . . .  Actual resulting 
prejudice can be established with a substantial claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel that would otherwise 
have been deemed defaulted.”45   
This rule is sensible, workable, and a proper reading of 
Martinez.  If Workman shows that his underlying ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claim has some merit and that his 
state post-conviction counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, he has shown sufficient 
                                              
42 Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1246. 
43 Gallow, 570 U.S. at 933. 
44 847 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2017) 
45 Id. at 513 (internal citations omitted). 
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prejudice from counsel’s ineffective assistance that his 
procedural default must be excused under Martinez.46  
 
B. Workman’s Underlying Claim Has “Some 
Merit” 
On the question presented by the amended certificate of 
appealability, Workman’s claim has “some merit” under the 
standard contemplated by Martinez.  Respondents argue that 
the claim that Workman’s trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for failing to present a cogent defense was not 
presented to the District Court and, therefore, was waived by 
Workman. 
 
We disagree that Workman waived this claim.  “A 
habeas corpus petition prepared by a prisoner without legal 
assistance may not be skillfully drawn and should thus be read 
generously.  ‘It is the policy of the courts to give a liberal 
construction to pro se habeas petitions.’”47  Reviewing the 
events at trial reflected by the record and the habeas petition 
prepared pro se by Workman, we construe his third ground for 
relief in his petition to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel based on trial counsel’s defective defense, which 
                                              
46 See Preston v. Superintendent of Graterford SCI & Att’y 
Gen. of Pa., No. 16-3095, slip op. at 21-22 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 
2018) (stating that “[a]ctual resulting prejudice” may be 
established “with a substantial claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel” (quoting Brown, 846 F.3d at 
513)). 
47 Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 
555 (3d Cir. 1969)). 
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included calling no witnesses, presenting no evidence, and 
arguing inconsistently with the testimony in evidence. 
 
C. Workman’s Post-Conviction Counsel 
Rendered Ineffective Assistance 
Workman’s state post-conviction counsel failed to 
recognize the merit of Workman’s claim that trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to present a cogent 
defense.  In a case in which trial counsel presented no witnesses 
or evidence and appeared on the face of the record to be unable 
to adapt to the medical examiner’s testimony that Hunt was 
alive when the ricocheted bullet struck him in the chest, 
Workman’s state post-conviction counsel presented one claim 
in PCRA proceedings: “ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
for failing to request a jury instruction that indicated that the 
transferred intent doctrine also applied to the petitioner’s claim 
of defense of use of force to protect a third person.”48  The 
Superior Court found that claim “nonsensical,” to the extent 
that it could not determine what exactly Workman, through 
state post-conviction counsel, claimed.49 
There is a “strong presumption” that an attorney’s 
decision to pursue some claims and decline to pursue others is 
a tactical choice.50  However, this presumption is not 
invincible: “A petitioner may rebut the suggestion that the 
challenged conduct reflected merely a strategic choice . . . by 
                                              
48 App. at 329. 
49 Id. 
50 Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (“When counsel 
focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a 
strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather 
than through sheer neglect.”). 
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showing that counsel omitted significant and obvious issues 
while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly 
weaker.”51 
 
Here, a significant and obvious issue existed: trial 
counsel’s utter and complete failure to test the 
Commonwealth’s case with appropriate cross-examination of 
Lieberman, his failure to present witnesses (either fact or 
expert) in support of his position, or to adapt his argument to 
the testimony in evidence instead of simply asserting the 
contrary statement that “[Hunt is] dead.  He’s dead from the 
first bullet.” 52  State post-conviction counsel overlooked these 
errors, as is apparent from his letter to Workman that said, 
“Contrary to your assessment, a review of the notes of 
testimony does not reveal ‘numerous issues of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.’  Trial counsel’s argument to the jury 
was an attempt to save you from a first[-]degree murder 
conviction.”53 
Moreover, the claim that state post-conviction counsel 
chose to pursue was clearly and significantly weaker.  The 
Superior Court held that the “nonsensical claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel lack[ed] merit.”54  It further stated that 
“even if we could make sense of [Workman’s] argument, he 
fails to establish how inclusion of the requested jury 
instructions would have been so influential that it would have 
likely changed the outcome of [Workman’s] trial.”55 
                                              
51 McKee v. United States, 167 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  
52 App. at 275. 
53 App. at 460. 
54 App. at 344. 
55 Id. 
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The evident weakness of this claim is not merely 
illuminated with the benefit of hindsight, as a “review of the 
certified record reveals that the trial court gave a thorough jury 
instruction regarding the defense of force to protect a third 
person.”56  In other words, it appears that state post-conviction 
counsel’s claim was that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a jury instruction that was actually given.  
This is the epitome of a doomed claim.   
 
In our view, Workman has rebutted the presumption 
that state post-conviction counsel made a strategic choice in 
omitting the issue of trial counsel’s failure to present a cogent 
defense, and that state post-conviction counsel’s performance 
was deficient under the “performance” prong of Strickland.  
We therefore conclude that Workman has satisfied the 
requirements of Martinez.  The procedural default of his 
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is excused. 
D. The Ineffective Asssitance of Workman’s 
Trial Counsel Violated Workman’s Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel 
Once procedural default is excused, “our review of a 
petitioner’s claim is de novo because the state court did not 
consider the claim on the merits.”57 
 
Workman’s trial counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness even without considering 
allegations of defective advice and purported plea agreements.  
                                              
56 Id. 
57 Bey, 856 F.3d at 236 (citing Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 
700, 710 n.4, 715 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
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In response to Lieberman’s testimony, which indicated that the 
blood evidence revealed that Hunt was alive when he was shot 
in the chest by the richocheted bullet fired by Workman, trial 
counsel argued that Lieberman possessed “unmitigated gall.”58  
Trial counsel did not call an expert witness to rebut 
Lieberman’s testimony, or call any fact witnesses.  Trial 
counsel’s cross-examination of Lieberman focused solely on 
establishing that Workman’s bullet did not hit Hunt first.  At 
best, trial counsel established that Lieberman could not 
conclusively state that Workman’s bullet hit Hunt before 
Moses’s.  He utterly failed to contend with the possibility that 
Moses’s bullet hit Hunt first, but Hunt remained alive when 
Workman’s bullet struck Hunt.  
 
“[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth 
Amendment requires that the accused have ‘counsel acting in 
the role of an advocate.’”59  Workman’s trial counsel acted as 
an advocate not of his client but of his theory—that one cannot 
kill a dead man, and therefore the jury could not convict 
Workman of homicide—all contrary to the facts and testimony 
before the jury.  Any objective standard of reasonableness 
requires counsel to understand facts and testimony and adapt 
to them, even at the expense of purportedly clever theories.  
Workman’s trial counsel appears to have misunderstood or 
willfully neglected this when faced with Lieberman’s 
testimony.  This falls below an objective standard of 
reasonable performance.60 
                                              
58 App. at 275. 
59 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (quoting 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967)). 
60 Even as early as the preliminary hearing, Lieberman testified 
that either gunshot wound would have been fatal to Hunt.  
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Typically, under Strickland, this deficient performance 
must be paired with specific prejudice—a reasonable 
probability that, but for trial counsel’s error or errors, the jury 
would have returned a different result.61  However, we are 
faced here with a trial counsel who effectively failed to present 
a case on his client’s behalf.  The effect of trial counsel’s errors 
is not limited to one discrete failure upon which the verdict 
might have turned, but instead pervades the entire proceeding. 
 
In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court held that 
“if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to 
meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of 
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process 
itself presumptively unreliable.”62  That is what we are faced 
with in the case before us.  Trial counsel’s failure to present a 
case on behalf of Workman or to modify his theory of the case 
to account for, if not rebut with evidence, the testimony offered 
by the Commonwealth, represents a near-total failure on the 
part of trial counsel to contest the Commonwealth’s case.  This 
is not to say that the decisions not to call a rebuttal expert on a 
defendant’s behalf or to decline to call fact witnesses in a 
defendant’s case-in-chief are inherently unreasonable.  Here, 
however, they clearly derived not from a legitimate and 
reasonable trial strategy but from trial counsel’s failure to 
understand what was happening in the case in which he was 
                                              
Thus, before trial began, counsel had notice that the 
Commonwealth had some evidence that cut against Workman.  
Counsel chose to ignore it and press his own theory to 
Workman’s detriment. 
61 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
62 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. 
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ostensibly participating.  The Commonwealth sought to prove 
that Workman killed Hunt, but Workman’s counsel sought 
only to prove his chosen theory seemingly without regard for 
the facts in evidence.  This deprived Workman of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  
 
As a result, we find that Workman’s trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective.  Workman is entitled to habeas 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.   
 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the District Court and remand with instructions to grant a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus. 
